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"Verily some people pondered about the Almighty and Glorious
Allah. Then the Holy Muslim Prophet of Islam
said, "Ponder over the CREATION of Allah, and do not ponder over Allah,
because you cannot catch His Power." With an understanding
of evolution, molecular biology and genetics, it is only in this century
that we are beginning to fully understand God's creation.
- 4. IMMANUEL KANT :
- 4.1 GAIA HIJACKED BY NEW AGERS:
- 4.2 KANT'S TELEOLOGY versus GOLDSMITH'S TELEOLOGY:
- 4.3 KANTIST TELEOLOGY & ECOLOGY :
- 5. CREATIONISM:
Before we can discuss Immanuel Kant within the context of this book, diverging a bit is necessary to explain the idea of Gaia and teleology.
4.1 GAIA HIJACKED BY NEW AGERS:
When I embarked upon this exercise, little did I know of or expect the pitfalls I would encounter and the traps and controversies laid, waiting for those who choose this route of investigation. These can be pedantic at the one extreme and presumptuous at the other. Often, there is criticism of phraseology and semantics, so an author's ridicule can result from a bad choice of words. Begon et al. (1986) for example insists, in a serious university text, that we cannot say that an animal is adapted to its environment, but by a new word, "abapted" by the environment. This is to avoid any sense of design implied in the language. Goldsmith (1992) on the other hand says that Gaia, an intelligent mother earth, is purposive and that living systems are intelligent! To followers of this theory, the earth, Gaia is a living intelligent creature that decides. Disproving this state of affairs turns solving a simple problem into a complex undertaking. The philosopher, Immanuel Kant comments on the invention of new words: "to invent new words where the language has no lack of expression for given notions is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true thoughts, yet by new patches on the old garment."
Thomas Hobbes, General J.C. Smuts, Immanuel Kant and of course, Charles Darwin, provides important conceptual foundations to this book. Another primary reference is the Holy Quraan, the revelation from God to the Holy Prophet, Muhammad. These sources provide strength to the final idea and represent the main areas of conflict in this book, namely theology (religion), ethics (morals), evolution, teleology and holism.
The average, person is biased in his or her thinking. To use a
currently popular word, western society possesses a common paradigm and
in the arrogance of certainty, people act like some scientists
interpreting data: "Inevitably they are interpreted in terms of a
scientist's particular paradigm" (Goldsmith, 1992). People see
life through a "cultural filter". To challenge this paradigm, the above
sources provide a freshness and newness to thought that inspires the
consciousness and enlivens the understanding. Together, they prepare
one for the holistic idea in that they provide a specific perspective
useful to the development of the holistic idea. Briefly, Hobbes
provides
clarity in reasoning and a moral philosophy, an essential tool for a
book
of this type. Smuts outlines a feasible scientific holism, upon which
we
can build a credible holistic concept. The Holy Quraan provides divine
absolute
constraints to the possible and a divine moral code. Kant provides an
extensive
insight into the ramifications of teleology. Charles Darwin provides a
practical and valid evolutionary explanation free of the strange
abstractions and esoteric
mathematics attempted today.
The logic developed to support the Gaian theory is not used in this
book as too many words imply a conscious will, whether intended or not.
If intended, it is still too anthropomorphic. If not intended, it is
misleading. There is no external 'something' controlling global ecology
(Lewin, 1993), so
Gaia is not an idea that forms a part of holism. Goldsmith (1992)
states,
"A life process also evolves for a purpose, that of fulfilling a
specific function within the hierarchy of the biosphere, to contribute
to
the maintenance of its critical order and hence its stability." This
is the fine line across which the adherents of Gaia cross. To remain
within
the bounds, of science one simply says "evolves a purpose" instead of
"evolves
FOR a purpose." A creature has evolved over aeons of time, so, if we
study
an ant today, we can identify the purpose of various anatomical
features.
Gaian adherents will say that the same evolved "for the purpose",
implying
a conscious will to nature, as if the process' end is controlled and
intended
and the purpose is an inner part of the creature. Professor Cooper
recognised
this failing and said that terms like "purpose" and "value" do not form
part
of ecology any more than they do evolutionary theory. To claim that the
Gaia Earth led to the creation of ants for some teleological outcome
and "SO AS TO" contribute some critical service is very different to
saying that the evolution of an ant has led to features in the ant for
which we can identify a purpose. Ants fulfil a role in nature. They
evolved within the context of
and subject to selective forces specific to their niche, but not 'so as
to'
fill that niche.
"God damn it, when you get a good idea in science, it's
pure intuition
and that is often extremely difficult to describe. If I'd known then
what
I know now, I wouldn't have written it like that" (Lewin,
1993). He
further claims, "Neither Lynn Margulis (his co-inventor) nor I
have
ever proposed a teleological hypothesis. It's true that some of the
things
I've written have been imprecise, and this was eagerly interpreted as
meaning
purposefulness in Gaia." He says that, "I needed to be
able
to demonstrate to others what I knew intuitively about Gaia - that
homeostasis
emerged as a property of the system." Jim Lovelock further
recognised,
"There's a huge amount of literature that is supposed to be about
Gaia,
that New Age stuff. It's 100 percent rubbish."
4.2 KANT'S TELEOLOGY versus GOLDSMITH'S TELEOLOGY:
"At exactly what
point does function make its appearance?"
(Dennett, 1995).
This chapter may be heavy going. Writing it was difficult. You may
skip it if you can simply accept that the holism I propose does not
imply a teleology with final causes of the Gaian type proposed by
Goldsmith. In this chapter I attempt to present Immanuel Kant in a
modern context. We need to take
heed of his caution: "It is, indeed, the common fate of human
reason
in speculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as
possible,
and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the FOUNDATION
is
a solid one or no."
The Gaia Hypothesis of Goldsmith describes nature as teleological. Comparing Goldsmith's (1992) outline of the principles of Gaian ecology with the teleology of Kant illustrates how the holistic principles of perpetuity and compatibility have a different source, or at least draw different deductions to Gaian teleology and are closely aligned to Kantist teleology.
In his book, "The Way", Goldsmith states, in the chapter, "Ecology
is Teleological", that the "teleological explanation of
the
life processes centres on its GOAL" - Aristotle's
'final cause'. A dictionary definition of teleology is:
[1] The explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes;
[2] the doctrine of design and purpose in the material world.
To say that the gravitational pull of the moon and the sun creates the tides in the ocean is not teleological, but to say that the purpose of the moon is to create the ocean tides is a teleological statement.
Kant (1724-1804) deals in some detail with the teleological idea in
his "Critique of Teleological Judgement" (Adler, et al, 1952). His work
reflects some strong currents of thought that flowed through society in
his time,
well before Darwin's Origin of Species. In beautiful but often abstract
and
complex writing, he ponders some problems of teleology still
encountered
and debated today. He claims that we are correct in applying a
teleological
conception to nature, but only to "bring it under principles of
observation
and research by analogy to the causality that looks to ends, while not
pretending to explain it by this means." I gave an example of
the moon above. Nature is not acting with a specific goal or purpose in
sight. In studying say the circulatory system of the body, we may
reflect that the heart serves a purpose - to pump the blood. What Kant
means by teleology in nature will become clearer as we go on.
Teleological reasoning means that we can conceive of forms such as organs as determined by "ends" or goals. There are two types of ends:
[1] An elephant is an "art-product", an animal adapted to a specific niche in the African ecosystem. It is an effect of evolution within this system and an end.
[2] Another form of end is that which serves as a means that other causes use in pursuit of ends. Grass is an end that a grazer uses for food.
This principle of teleology reduces the phenomena of nature to rules to aid our understanding where mechanical causality or blind mechanism is not a sufficient explanation. We can say that the eye has evolved for sight. As an organ of the body it serves a specific function. If we try to study the mechanisms involved in the eye, we have to adopt a teleological approach and look at the eye as a part of a whole - the body. The eye serves a purpose in relation to the whole body. It functions within the context of the whole. Today an engineering term, reverse engineering is used to describe the process or technique of studying biological form with the assumption that there is a good rationale for the features observed (Dennett, 1995). A failing of this adaptationist explanation of all features is that there can be many explanations or "Just So Stories", but only one true fit to the facts (Dennett, 1995). Two engineers looking at a component in a machine may give different explanations as to the purpose served by the component. Their perceptions and reverse engineering have arrived at different conclusions. Both may be reasonable explanations, but only one is correct.
Teleological reasoning allows us to form a conception of an object
as if
teleology were to be found in nature instead of in our mind. Kant says
that
it is only by ANALOGY that we can relate the MENTAL CONCEPTION to the
nature
under study. When we reason that the eye has evolved for the purpose of
allowing
us to see, this does not imply that this purpose was inherent within
the
eye or that the creature had eyes as a goal. Opposing this, Goldsmith
insists
that "one ruse is to deny the purposiveness of life processes
altogether
and to argue that nature only appears purposeful." Stating this
simply,
we may find a purpose for features such as feathers, the hollow bones
and
wing structure of birds, serving to improve flight, but this does not
imply
that the creature pursues such an evolutionary purpose. Knowing that
birds
fly, we can study its structure in terms of flight. Feathers serve a
purpose
in flight, but the bird did not purposefully develop feathers to fly
better.
Feathers evolved through the slow incremental changes due to the
survival
advantage conferred by the physical trait. Other individuals would
quickly
eliminate an animal with malformed feathers through competition,
starvation
or predation. Kantist teleological reasoning (and later Smuts) that
people
use to explain wholes, such as organisms found in nature, is very
different
from the teleology of Gaian adherents who claim that Gaian processes
are
purposive and have a goal.
Goldsmith using the example of a fish, insists that the evolution of gills and fins is purposeful, enabling fish to breathe and move about in their aquatic environment. The confusion and controversy here centres around evolution. Features have evolved over billions of years through their contribution to survival. They are parts of a whole. Today we can look at an animal in its environment and say that we can understand the purpose of gills. Gills are a product of evolution. Goldsmith is saying that the purpose of the process is gills as if the result is somehow targeted.
A point that Kant raises very early in his discussion is that, in the consideration of nature, we do NOT take (her) to be an INTELLIGENT BEING. On the other hand, Goldsmith claims Gaia is alive and that living systems are intelligent. Goldsmith needs to impart such qualities upon his Gaian nature if conscious purpose and goals are going to be an inherent part of Gaian nature. For Gaian adherents, the earth is an intelligent being acting purposely and wilfully. Kant's teleology does NOT credit nature with causes acting DESIGNEDLY, but is a more evolutionary and holistic idea. The order, structure and form that emerge from evolution results from a process or mechanism - it is the product evolving through natural selection.
Kant goes on to develop his teleological idea by an example of
geometric figures, such as a circle or triangle, whose finality
is "manifestly objective and intellectual, not simply subjective and
aesthetic." A triangle is always a triangle with its relational laws
understood through reason. Geometry proceeds from principles derived
from the order and regularity of the forms under study (this objective
finality "belonging to the nature of the things"). Kant
says this application of geometry is an intellectual finality that is
simply formal, not real. In other words, it is a finality that does NOT
imply an underlying END, and therefore, does not stand in need
of teleology. There is no teleology in geometry - they are intellectual
ideas.
In a clear distinction of ideas, he also introduces the possibility of subjective, "AESTHETIC FINALITY" and the appreciation of beauty that is also not teleological. We may seek ends such as beauty, but they are ends of our own imagination. Subtle beauty may be the ultimate expression of human perfection, character and spontaneity, yet this is subjective perception and definitely has no teleology involved.
Another form of understanding that he distinguishes is RELATIVE
FINALITY, which is again different from the intrinsic finality of a
natural object (belonging to the thing itself) and NOT TELEOLOGICAL in
any form. By relative finality he means that clearly particular things
of nature (living or nonliving) are utilised by other forms of life,
which are then ends, and may in turn serve for other life forms. As
such, we may recognise that "there is no healthier soil for pine
trees than a sandy soil"; the sand being a relative end and the
means thereto the physical process that caused this sand deposit to
accumulate. Goldsmith, claiming that nature is purposeful, would say
that the primordial deposit of sand tracts was an end that nature had
in view for the benefit of the possible pine forests that might grow on
them. To say so says Kant, would be a "hazardous and arbitrary
assertion." It is exactly the view that many Creationists who
do not support evolution
hold. (This question reveals the absence of the conception of
evolution).
Similarly there has to be grass on the earth to support cattle,
sheep, horses and the like. Today, we admire these innovations of
nature, as in the relationship between the bee and the flower, and we
recognise the dependence of the one upon the other, so this
distinction, termed a relative finality, for the many relations of
nature to an end, is valid. However, not having an understanding of the
evolution of species or natural selection, Kant notes
that the utilisation of grass or the "adaptability" (his term) of grass
to
sustain animals is contingent and a mere raw material. The absence of
the
modern idea of evolution, where organisms adapt to their environment,
required
or influenced Kant's introduction of the idea of a "relative end". He
recognised
that pine forests can be assumed to be a natural end, while what man
adapts
to his own arbitrary whims by using his reason is not a relative end.
Without
the understanding that the pine trees evolve and are adapted to their
specific
niche, Kant has to introduce the idea of a relative end and that the
"sand must be admitted to be an end also."
In this system of relative ends, the 'effect' or physical item, such as a horse can be considered as an end. It in turn serves as a means that other causes, such as a human, can use in pursuit of an end, or adapt to the purpose he has in view, such as travel. Kant terms this form of finality a utility if it concerns human beings and adaptability where it concerns other creatures. Without a conception of evolution he does not attempt to explain how this adaptation of animals to their environment arose; nor does he recognise the degree of interdependence that has evolved and is epitomized by the relationship of the bee and the flower. The holistic explanation describes this process within the context of evolution and natural selection and so holism progresses a step further than the teleology of Kant. In the description of Holism by Smuts are similarities to the teleology of Kant, and evidence that Smuts developed his idea from the "Critique of teleological judgement" by Kant. Darwin's evolution and natural selection also forms an integral part of the idea developed by J.C. Smuts.
Kant then introduces his form of teleology by saying that a "thing
exists as a PHYSICAL END if it is both cause and effect of ITSELF"
and is an idea made up of "component factors." This he explains, is to
be
found in a tree that perpetuates - "the tree which it produces is
of
the same genus. Hence, in its genus, it produces itself. In the genus,
now
as effect, now as cause, continually generated from itself and likewise
generating
itself, it preserves itself generically." It sounds like a
definition
for the term perpetuity and implies inheritance! The physical end is
the
perpetuating tree or other living organism!
Describing his teleological idea, he continues by observing that the
tree PRODUCES itself even as an individual. In growth, it assimilates
matter
(nutrients, carbon dioxide etc.) and "bestows upon it a
specifically
distinctive quality which the MECHANISM of nature OUTSIDE it CANNOT
supply,
and develops itself by means of a material which, in its composite
character,
is its own product." Kant explains that the "constituents
(raw
materials) that it derives from nature outside, . . . must be regarded
as
only an educt." Approaching a holistic concept, he notes that a
part
of a TREE also generates itself so that "THE PRESERVATION OF ONE
PART
IS RECIPROCALLY DEPENDENT ON THE PRESERVATION OF THE OTHER PARTS." A
tree needs its roots and leaves. In this fashion a product of nature
must,
from its character, "stand to itself reciprocally in the relation
of cause and effect" - it perpetuates - "it is a nexus
(connection,
link) constituting a series, namely of causes and effects, that is
invariably
progressive" (dynamic). A tree is the "effect" of its parents
and
the "cause" of its progeny and is thereby termed a PHYSICAL END of
nature.
Next, Kant introduces requirements and conditions for a thing to be
considered a physical end in a teleological sense. His description is
very close to
a holistic conception. "The first requisite . . . IS THAT ITS
PARTS,
BOTH AS TO THEIR EXISTENCE AND FORM, ARE ONLY POSSIBLE BY THEIR
RELATION
TO THE WHOLE." A heart forms a part of a whole - the organism
or physical end, and in this context teleology is recognised. The heart clearly serves a PURPOSE in relation to the
whole
and a doctor can describe the purpose of the heart in this context. We
cannot
understand the mechanism of the pumping of blood except in the purpose
the
heart serves for the body. The explanation is not of a "blind"
mechanism
but requires a teleological context. Dennett (1995) clearly draws the
difference
between blind mechanism and the teleological context in a different
way.
He explains that "The solar system exhibits stupendous Order,
but does
not (apparently) have a purpose - it isn't for anything. An eye, in
contrast,
is for seeing."
A physical end is independent of the causality of external rational
agents (in its interpretation). As a product of nature the
relation of the physical end originates "intrinsically and in
its inner possibility" so that a second requisite is that "THE
PARTS OF THE THING COMBINE OF THEMSELVES INTO THE UNITY OF THE WHOLE BY
BEING RECIPROCALLY CAUSE AND EFFECT OF THEIR FORM." "IN SUCH A NATURAL
PRODUCT AS THIS EVERY PART IS
THOUGHT AS OWING ITS PRESENCE TO THE AGENCY OF ALL THE REMAINING PARTS,
AND ALSO AS EXISTING FOR THE SAKE OF THE OTHERS AND OF THE WHOLE, THAT
IS
AS AN INSTRUMENT , OR ORGAN."
Goldsmith uses teleology, applicable only to the parts of a perpetuating organism, for support for his teleological Gaia. He turns the recognition of a purpose - a mental construction or conception - into an intrinsic purpose of nature. When a physiologist is studying the body's process and controlling mechanism he is studying a physical end of nature, which is a whole, a unity of parts. He must by necessity find the purpose of various processes, but we cannot say that the purpose inheres the animal so that the animal has a goal.
In order not to be merely an instrument of art, such as is modern
technology, Kant introduces another requisite for the idea of teleology
- REPRODUCTION or perpetuation, as occurs in nature: "only under
these conditions and upon these terms can such a product be an
ORGANIZED and SELF-ORGANISED BEING, and, as such, be called a physical
end." Thus, whereas in a
watch the PRODUCING CAUSE is contained outside the material and the
watch lacks any self-organising ability to perpetuate or repair or
maintain itself, a living creature is self-organised. "An
organised being is, therefore NOT a mere MACHINE. For a machine has
solely motive power, whereas an organised being possesses inherent
formative power . . . a self-propagating formative power, which CANNOT
be explained by the capacity of movement alone, that is to say, by
MECHANISM." The watch is mere mechanism, while the bird is
teleological.
Kant recognises the heritable character and variation present in
nature and its potential ecological consequence: "Nature
organises itself, and does so in each species of its organised products
- following a SINGLE PATTERN (inheritance), certainly as to general
features, but nevertheless ADMITTING DEVIATIONS (genetic variation)
calculated to secure self-preservation (perpetuity) under particular
circumstances (ecological adaptation)." As such, for Kant,
"organisms are . . . the only beings in nature, considered in
their separate existence and apart from any relation to other things,
cannot be thought possible except as ENDS OF NATURE."
Organisms provide science with the BASIS FOR A TELEOLOGY. This
applies to biological systems only and cannot be found in physics. "This
principle, the statement of which serves to define what is meant by
ORGANISMS, is as follows: an organised natural product is one in which
every part is reciprocally both end and means. In such a product
nothing is in vain, without an end, or to be ascribed to a blind
mechanism of nature."
It is in the organism that we can identify a purpose: "It is
common knowledge that scientists who dissect plants and animals,
seeking to investigate their structure and to see into the reasons why
and the end for which they are provided with such and such parts, why
the parts have such and such position
and interconnection, and why the internal form is precisely what it is,
adopt
the above maxim as absolutely necessary. So they say nothing in such
forms
of life is in vain, and they put the maxim on the same footing of
validity
as the fundamental principle of all natural science, that is, nothing
happens
by chance. THEY ARE, IN FACT, QUITE UNABLE TO FREE THEMSELVES FROM THIS
TELEOLOGICAL
PRINCIPLE AS FROM THAT OF GENERAL PHYSICAL SCIENCE" - " . . . mere
mechanism
no longer proves adequate in this domain." . . ."It is no doubt
the
case that in an animal body, for example, many parts might be explained
as
accretions on simple mechanical laws (as skin, bone, hair). Yet the CAUSE
that accumulates the appropriate material, modifies and fashions it,
and
deposits it in its proper place, must always be estimated
teleologically."
Darwin identified this "cause" as natural selection.
This teleological reasoning is admitted to by evolutionists: "The
role of the evolutionary biologist is then to construct a plausible
argument about how each part functions as an adaptive device"
(Lewontin, 1978). An anatomist aims to explain an animal's features by
how well suited they are to the function they perform.
4.3 KANTIST TELEOLOGY & ECOLOGY:
We can extend the Kantist teleological analogy to long established
ecological systems that have an array of interdependent or
long-associated species. A careful distinction has to be made from the
relative finality of the type "cow eats grass." An ecosystem is a
physical end and the component species are parts of this unity
so that:
[1] THE PRESERVATION OF ONE PART IS RECIPROCALLY DEPENDENT ON THE PRESERVATION OF THE OTHER PARTS.
This applies to the same extent in ecosystems as to the appendages
of a
body. Some organisms are more essential parts of an ecosystem than
others. An ecosystem can lose some species and still be a functional
unit. If it loses its "keystone species", those that dominate the
system and affect the survival and abundance of the other species, the
whole structure of the system will change. In an experiment in Brazil,
scientists ran the Minimum Critical Size of Ecosystems Project (MCS) to
find the smallest size a rain forest can
be and still sustain its inhabitants. It later became part of the
Biological Dynamics of Forest Fragments Project. As rain forest was
cleared, square
patches of forest from one hectare to one thousand hectares in size
were
left intact. On smaller "islands", species diversity decreased rapidly.
Daytime
winds penetrated deeply into the forest, drying out the forest and
killing
deep-forest trees and shrubs for distances inward of 100 metres or more
(Wilson,
1992). Stripped of the plant species adapted to live on the forest
edges
and withstand the impact of winds, the forest dehydrated! Deep forest
plants
were not adapted to this exposure.
[2] ITS PARTS, BOTH AS TO THEIR EXISTENCE AND FORM, ARE ONLY POSSIBLE BY THEIR RELATION TO THE WHOLE.
An animal occupies a niche that by definition defines an animal's
existence, form and functions in relation to the whole system. The
giraffe of the African savannah would not stand a chance of survival in
the Arctic tundra environment. In the same MCS project in [1] above,
plots of less than 10 hectares in
size, could not support army-ant colonies. These colonies require a
forest
area of more than 10 hectares to maintain their worker force. Larger
animals
such as peccaries, pumas, jaguars and pacas left the smaller plots.
Departure
of the peccaries ended the characteristic wallows that they created, in
which temporary forest pools could form. Three species of Phyllomedusa
frogs, which depended upon these pools to breed and for their young to
survive,
then became extinct! Shade loving butterflies of the deep forest also
succumbed to the drying winds (Wilson, 1992).
[3] THE PARTS OF THE THING COMBINE OF THEMSELVES INTO THE UNITY OF THE WHOLE BY BEING RECIPROCALLY CAUSE AND EFFECT OF THEIR FORM.
Organisms perpetuate and interact and in this process evolve into an
association of dependence and interdependence that gives rise to the
unity of the whole. Again using the rain forest MCS project, the new
conditions increased the amount of forest "edge" and species
specialised to live around the forest edges flourished. Normally such
"wounds" would be like small scabs that
easily heal through the effect of these plants, but deforestation
devastated
most of the forest creatures. Five species of ant bird followed the
extinction of the army ants. Fruit eating saki monkeys could not find
enough food to sustain viable populations in plots smaller than 10
hectares. With the decline in mammal and bird populations, the dung and
carrion dependent scarab beetles declined in numbers. With them
declined mites that prey upon fly maggots, increasing the possibility
of disease transmission by flies to mammals and birds. The changes with
the destruction of the whole are intricate and complex and reflect that
the whole provided a stability that had evolved over millions of years.
Many different creatures had evolved and adapted to the stable
conditions found within the whole. When the forest was reduced in size,
conditions
that had persisted for millions of years and that usually changed
slowly
changed abruptly, resulting in mass extinctions.
[4] IN SUCH A NATURAL PRODUCT AS THIS, EVERY PART IS THOUGHT AS OWING ITS PRESENCE TO THE AGENCY OF ALL THE REMAINING PARTS, and AS EXISTING FOR THE SAKE OF THE OTHERS AND OF THE WHOLE, THAT IS AS AN INSTRUMENT, OR ORGAN.
The term, "existing for the sake of" is dangerously close to Goldsmith's style of describing Gaia. Its analogy in the human body is the heart, which exists for the sake of the body. In nature creatures perform a function that, through natural selection, forms an integral part of the whole community. This arises through what Darwin recognised as a tendency for differentiation. This is compatibility. Putman (1994) acknowledges that stable populations contribute to the stability of communities.. He recognises ecosystems as complex wholes.
An ecosystem is a natural product in which, often, every component or part, through dependence, owes its presence to the stability of the system conferred by the agency of all the remaining parts. Organisms serve as an instrument of the system through a reciprocal conferring of stability evolved through the process of adaptation via natural selection. Edward O. Wilson (1992) vividly describes the balance found in a rain forest:
"On a larger scale, the storms drive change in the whole
structure of the forest. The natural dynamism raises the diversity of
life by means of local destruction and regeneration.
Somewhere a large horizontal tree limb is weak and vulnerable, covered by a dense garden of orchids, bromeliads, and other kinds of plants that grow on trees. The rain fills the cavities enclosed by the axil sheaths of the epiphytes and soaks the humus and clotted dust around their roots. After years of growth the weight has become nearly insupportable. A gust of wind whips through or lightning strikes the tree trunk, and the limb breaks and plummets down, clearing a path to the ground. Elsewhere the crown of a giant tree emergent above the rest catches the wind and the tree sways above the rain soaked soil. The shallow roots cannot hold, and the entire tree keels over. Its trunk and canopy arc downward like a blunt axe, shearing through smaller trees and burying understory bushes and herbs. Thick lianas coiled through the limbs are pulled along. Those that stretch to other trees act as hawsers to drag down still more vegetation. The massive root system heaves up to create an instant mound of bare soil. At yet another site, close to a river's edge, the rising water cuts an overhanging bank to the critical level of gravity, and a 20-metre front collapses. Behind it a small section of forest floor slides down, toppling trees and burying low vegetation.
Such events of minor violence open gaps in the forest. The sky clears again and sunlight floods the ground. The surface temperature rises and the humidity falls. The soil and ground litter dries out and warms up still more, creating a new environment for animals, fungi, and micro-organisms of a different kind from those in the dark forest interior. In the following months pioneer plant species take seed. They are very different from the young shade-loving saplings and understory shrubs of the prevailing old-stand forest. Fast-growing, small in nature, and short-lived, they form a single canopy that matures far below the upper crowns of the older trees all around. Their tissue is soft and vulnerable to herbivores. The palmate-leaved trees of the genus Cecropia, one of the gap-filling specialists of Central and South America, harbour vicious ants in hollow internodes of the trunk. These insects, bearing the appropriate scientific name Azteca, live in symbiosis with their hosts, protecting them from all predators except sloths and a few other herbivores specialised to feed on Cecropia. The symbionts live among new assemblages of species not found in the mature forest."
"All around the second-growth vegetation, the fallen trees and branches rot and crumble, offering hiding places and food to a vast array of creatures and life forms such as fungi, ants, beetles, lice, ear wigs, spiders, springtails, scorpions. Full transformation to the mature forest takes about 100 years."
Ecosystems, or what Kant calls "aggregate nature as a
system ", satisfy the requirements of a physical end to
which we can apply Kantist teleology to better understand the
interdependence that is evident. Such interdependence is a subjective
human conception or maxim - a general truth drawn from science and
experience - and not a goal seeking purpose
of nature. This maxim, through which the whole mechanism of nature has
to
be subordinated on principles of reason, states: "everything in
the
world is good for something or other; nothing in it is in vain; we are
entitled, nay incited, by the example that nature affords us in its
organic products, to expect nothing from it and its laws but what is
final when things are
viewed as a whole." This is not the Gaian teleology of final
causes,
but the Kantist teleology of physical ends, the ends of nature. "It
is only in so far as matter is organised that it necessarily involves
the
conception of it as a physical end, because here it possesses a form
that
is at once SPECIFIC and a product of nature."
This organisation of ecosystems becomes levels of organisation in the hierarchy of nature. There is a distinction between life and matter. We know that atoms bond into molecules, which are assembled into nuclei, mitochondria or other organelles. Organelles form a part of cells, that associate as tissues and organs. Organs form parts of organisms that in turn form part of ecosystems (Wilson, 1992). Atoms, as we know, do not change their nature in any evolutionary sense in the formation of molecules. Sub-atomic structure does not conform to the whole. From the molecule upwards, evolution is possible, conforming that level to the whole. Molecular structure can evolve to more effectively function in the cell wall for example. A cell may evolve to function as part of a specialised tissue and so on upward. All changes are essentially molecular (Behe, 1998). Atoms provide constraints to what molecular forms are possible, but form the substrate of the teleological process and are not subject to Kantist teleology. It is only in the creativity of life, where evolution is possible, that Kantist teleology takes place. The lifeless atomic and subatomic realm of the physicist is not a part of Kantist teleology. Different processes seem to lead to the formation of life systems and atomic structure. Ecological systems form through the long evolution of the associated species.
The close association and interaction of perpetuating species, subject to natural selection, as exists in ecosystems, provides the conditions that make Kantist teleology possible. Long association allows the operation of the mechanism through which this form of teleology evolves. Organisms, including humanity can then be studied or evaluated in their relation to the whole system of which they are a part. At the ecosystem level of organisation, with interdependence and coadaptation found between associated organisms, the mode of perpetuation of the ecosystem is to be found in the parts, the individual organisms. The bee and the flower epitomise coadaptive interdependence, while the camouflage of a prey species illustrates an adaptation that is not necessarily coadaptive.
An example of adaptation is found in the peppered moth (Biston
betularia ) in England. In the early 1800's, this moth was white
with black speckling. Moths settled on pale lichen covered tree trunks
where their coloration served
as camouflage against bird predators. Evolution within their habitat
had
selected for this coloration as a selective advantage - an adaptation.
Industrialisation
spread soot and dirt across the countryside, reducing pale lichens
growing
on tree trunks, leaving the bark a uniform black. Bird predators in
these
polluted woods easily saw and ate the pale moths. This led to the
adaptation
and continued survival of this moth through the mutation to a
melanistic
black form (called carbonaria). Pale moths were easy prey in the
polluted
woods, while carbonaria was well camouflaged and flourished. In the
clean
western and northern Great Britain, the pale form is better camouflaged
on
the pale lichen covered tree trunks and so persists (Smith, 1990).
Coevolution differs from the above in that two associated species
evolve in response
to one another.
Today, this rate is increased by the evolutionary history of living (extant) organisms. On some new terrain, some new form of soil bacteria, so necessary to nutrient cycling for plants, does not need billions of years to evolve. Wind and rain carry such bacteria to the new site. Basic building blocks of an ecosystem arrive by dispersal from established areas and not by evolution. A volcanic eruption created the island of Anak Krakatau in 1930 in the Sundra Strait between Sumatra and Java. On the sterile land, scientists collected 72 species of spiders, springtails, crickets, earwigs, barklice, hemipterous bugs, moths, flies, beetles and wasps, all brought to the island through aerial dispersal (Wilson, 1992). Those creatures that survive and reproduce pass the first phase of natural selection. Selective forces acting on the genetic variation of each generation adapt the creatures to the new habitat. Initially the harsh physical environment defines which organisms form part of a new ecosystem. The principle of ecological succession applies in that the presence of some species allows the colonisation and arrival of others.
High species diversity is enabled by the environmental stability of the tropics (Putman, 1994). More harsh environments will eliminate all but the hardiest creatures. While the system attains a stable association of species, natural selection influences the development of interdependence and coadaptation between some of these organisms. Interdependence generally increases the survival potential of the associated organisms and the stability of the system. Associations of interdependent living organisms function at a lower, more efficient energetic level than newly formed associations. This influences the functioning of the system as a whole so that it becomes more able to compete against invaders that are less efficient.
To penetrate a system of interdependent organisms one has to either live by the system's rules or destroy the whole system. Humanity has generally chosen the latter route. Where two or more organisms have formed an association, it is more difficult for a new arrival to displace the occupant of a specific niche. This is because it is not merely the resources available that define the niche, but also the associated species that are a part of the system.
Directional evolution takes the form of the selection of more efficient interactions. Associations evolve so that the animal is better suited to utilise the resources of its niche. This results in the paradox that competition leads, through natural selection, to compatibility.
The evolutionary process takes a very long time. Fossil records show
that five major extinctions and at least seven less severe extinctions
occurred on a global scale (Gore, 1989). It took tens of millions of
years for full restoration of the original diversity (Donovan, 1989).
Recovery from mass extinction of species at the end of the Ordovician
Period (440 million years ago) required 25 million years, the Devonian
(365 mya.) extinctions took
30 million years, the twin extinction events of the Permian (245 Mya.)
and
Triassic (210 Mya.) took 100 million years and the Cretaceous (65 Mya.)
took
20 million years! (Wilson, 1992). When we consider that the human race
is
no more than 200,000 years old, then we may realise enormity of the
destruction
that we are imparting upon nature right now. In the " Book of Time" described earlier, each page
represents
10 million years, so recovery from the Triassic extinction event took
ten
pages of time! Compared to Humanity's one line of evolutionary history,
this is an immense period!
[1] Physical change - the development of an adaptive phenotype (a phenotype is a physical characteristic). This may be a gross effect, such as the evolution of longer limbs, or subtle, such as a physiological change that improves kidney function. (One may add the category of physiological changes, but as these are molecular changes, they fall within the category of a physical change.)
[2] Behavioural - beneficial adaptations of the behavioural repertoire. A behavioural change may often precede a physical change.
[3] Genetic - the enhanced ability to evolve in response to selective pressures. This process occurs on the genotype and is a little studied mechanism.
"Evolutionary processes . . . shape and mould existing
structures and behaviour. Although they can undergo profound and sudden
evolutionary changes, new structures and behaviours do not appear
without evolutionary antecedents" (Gibson, 1993). The nucleus of
the cell, or the germ
cells, which unite in conception, contain the information of the race
or
species, as a register of the past, and so make the past an operative
factor
in the present. (They also contain the mechanism of variation) (Smuts,
1926).
Teleonomy, like Kant's 'relative ends' assumes that organisms are
adapted
to their environment.
Kantist teleology introduces the principle of final causes to
physical science, but it does not interfere with the mechanistic
principle of physical causality. It in no way implies and is
"altogether silent on the point of whether anything estimated according
to it is, or is not, an end of nature by DESIGN." Teleonomy is not in
conflict with Kantist teleology, but rather, Kantist teleology subsumes
teleonomy. The former is merely another idea
of the human mind necessary to understand perpetuating organisms.
Teleonomy, is another maxim to be added to the maxims of Kantist
teleology - one that arises out of the knowledge of evolution, natural
selection and the principles of genetics.
5. CREATIONISM:
Back to Religion page
Hua Hu Ching: "The tiny particles which form the vast universe are
not
tiny at all. Neither is the vast universe vast. These are notions of
the mind,
which is like a knife, always chipping away at the Tao, trying to
render it
graspable and manageable."(Walker, 1992).
"O man! What has seduced you from your Lord, Most Beneficent?
He who created you, fashioned you in due proportion, and gave you a
just bias. In whatever form He wills, does He put you together!"
(QsLXXXIIv6-8). "It is He who created all things and ordered them in
due proportions" (created all things with a JUST MEASURE) (QsXXVv2),
"who has created and further, given order and proportion, who has
ordained laws and granted guidance" (QsLXXXVIIv2-3). "He has created
the heavens and the earth for just ends" (QsXVIv3). The fact
of God, the Creator having made creation for JUST ENDS means that
scientists will find natural laws and an order and the emergence of
qualities that can be related back to nature. No physicist can deny
this, for have
they not constructed the periodic table
of
atoms on such an order and consistency in the atomic realm! Each
atom
is the consequence of the earlier evolution of matter that took place
during
the formation of the cosmos and represents an 'end'.
A philosopher can reason his way out of belief in a Creator or One
as the
cause of all things, calling it a theory (Hubbard, 1962) or hypothesis
(Dennett,
1995). Dennett (1995) describes beautifully the sentiment of awe that
allows
the perception of a Creator in the creation: "we still have the
stupendous
fact that the laws do permit this wonderful unfolding to happen, and
that
has been quite enough to inspire many people to surmise that the
Intelligence
of the Creator is the Wisdom of the Lawgiver, instead if the Ingenuity
of
the Engineer". . . "if in imagination we change any of these values by
just
the tiniest amount, we thereby posit a universe in which none of this
could
have happened, and indeed in which apparently nothing lifelike could
ever
have emerged: no planets, no atmospheres, no solids at all . . . "
He then goes on to denounce this belief and introduce a theory of his
own.
He tries to establish that the "existence of a universe obeying
a set
of laws even as elegant as the Life Law (or the laws of our own
physics)
does not logically require an intelligent Lawgiver." He
suggests
a "Darwinian alternative" saying that "there has been an
evolution
of worlds (in the sense of whole universes), and the world we find
ourselves
in is simply one among countless others that have existed through
eternity."
But a man can imagine and believe anything as the asylums attest.
As Kant and later Smuts noted, natural science is empirical, while the conception of God involves what he calls the supersensible - that which is beyond the senses. We cannot really make inferences about God from the facts of nature. Nature is about form, while God is formless. There is thus a boundary or limitation separating the two concepts - the consideration of an end of nature in a teleological and empirical sense and the contemplation of God and the subsequent theological consideration. In the former context, we need to restrict ourselves to a consideration of the ends of nature only and find out how these final products are produced by a mechanism and according to known empirical laws (Cameron, 1995).
You need to view the above quotations from the Holy Quraan in a
holistic context. God is the author of the whole and is not subject to
the focal point
type perception that we have. We need to invent tools to analyse,
however imperfectly, our world. He knows everything perfectly and time
and space
do not limit Him. Our understanding is limited to the perspective that
our
senses allow us to perceive. For God, there is no limit to his
perception
and awareness: "With Him are the keys of the Unseen, the
treasures
that none knoweth but He. He knoweth whatever there is on the earth and
in
the sea. Not a leaf falls but with his knowledge: there is not a grain
in
the darkness of the earth, nor anything fresh or dry, but is in a
Record
clear" (QsVI,59). God's knowledge is holistic knowledge of the
absolute
type that perhaps only the few saints and Prophets have an inkling of.
A good example of the frailty of science is the single axiom,
mutations, upon which the whole of evolution hinges. Charlotte Avers,
the author of the book "Process and patterns in Evolution",
notes that "A world
without mutation is a non evolving world." Mutations lead to
the presence
of new genetic information that can then be tested through natural
selection
for its fitness value. However when asking where all mutations come
from
we run into a problem and a weapon for the natural theologian.
Experimental
research
has established that mutations are rare, random, recurrent and
reversible.
Most scientists grasp onto this random nature of mutations and insist
evolution
is a blind, non teleological process. However these four principles
were
established and are verified repeatedly in studies where mutations are
induced
through physical and chemical agents called mutagenic agents. These
agents
are mostly artificial and increase the mutation rates above the natural
rate. In nature, where many of these mutagens are not found in an
organism's
habitat, spontaneous mutations occur. Avers notes that "Spontaneous
mutations have no known cause, by definition . . ." He goes on
to
say that "It is well known that radiation and some chemicals in
the
environment are responsible for a substantial fraction of spontaneous
mutations."
What will interest the natural theologian is what causes the
rest
of these spontaneous mutations. Science is unable to disprove or prove
that
all mutations are random and that there is not some causative agent
directing
evolution through critical mutations.
If God created the universe with "order and proportion", it is
merely necessary
to discover these laws and that is what empirical scientists set out to
do!
As a reflection of this perception about the physical creation,
Einstein
said, "In every important advance the physicist finds that the
fundamental
laws are simplified more and more as experimental research advances. He
is
astonished to notice how sublime order emerges from what appeared to be
chaos.
And this cannot be traced back to the workings of his own mind but is
due
to a quality that is inherent in the world of perception."
Leibniz
well expressed this quality by calling it a "pre-established harmony"
(Appleyard,
1992).
Humanity can recognise laws defining or governing processes. Our focal perception allows us to recognise a regularity and propose a law. In accord with this reductionist perception, science is a reductionist science, finding laws at the level of investigation. Perhaps a person looks at the atomic level using the most recent tools of physics, or at the level of animal and plant distributions using the recently established tools of analytical biogeography. In contrast, God's point of reference is not subject to time - there is no evolution for Him as there is no focal point. When He says "Be!", it is. He is not subject to any conditions! To get an inkling of this we may imagine life on earth where time is a dimension like space and we can look into the distance of time and see a long continuum that is our species. From this perspective there is no change, but a holism with time as another dimension. His awareness is independent of the "here and now" of time. Our science cannot even dare attain this level of holistic awareness. All talk of teleology is due to our subjection to time.
From the holistic context, the physical forces that caused atomic structures, have led through time to a sequence of events that led to the emergence of life and then the evolution of life. If the temperature falls below the freeze point of water, it becomes ice, a physical fact and consequence of the chemical or atomic nature of water. The whole creation process is made up of a multitude of similar physical events as inevitable as ice formation and according to physical laws.
In physics, according to Kant, the internal relation of some things
requires that the only form of explanation be on natural laws conceived
upon the
teleology of natural ends. In such a context then, Kant says that in
physics,
one may speak teleologically of "the wisdom, the economy, the
forethought,
the beneficence of nature. In so doing we do not convert nature into an
intelligent being, for that would be absurd; neither do we dare to
think of placing
another being, one that is intelligent, above nature as its architect,
for
that would be extravagant." Similarly, "no one would
ascribe
design, in the proper sense of the term, to a lifeless material"
and yet we "speak of nature as if its finality were a thing of
design."
It is this misuse of the English language that has led to the whole
controversy of Gaia as a living, purposive and intelligent system. It
is a pity to see this confusion reinforced by Gaian adherents. There
has to be a clear separation of empirical natural science based on the
senses from conceptions of God
as a Creator and other theological issues. The two are independent
fields
of study with separate philosophical structures.
Interactive religious philosophies such as Taoism and Sufi mysticism
aspire to perceive and be subsumed by the One, but again this is not
science. While the mystic in the forest is absorbed in the whole, the
scientist will be
trying to cure the sand worm and fungus causing the maddening itch in
his
foot, studying the life cycle of the mosquito sucking his blood (giving
him
malaria), investigating whether his spicy diet has caused the diabetic
comas
that he endures and trying to conserve the biotic diversity of the
forest
so he can better understand and study it. Then, the mystic flies away
as
a bat and both the scientist and mystic are confused.
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"from the facts of nature no inference of
God is justified." Smuts puts this in a better context quite
beautifully, "The belief in the Divine Being rests, and
necessarily must rest,
on quite different grounds, as a God whose concept is deduced from
natural
process is not a being whom the soul can worship"; (Cameron,
1994).
This book is based upon the empirical. In it, we may brush with the
religious
or divine, but need not apply theological principles to the empirical.
We
may find mutual support between the two, but must consciously keep the
conceptual structures separate. No matter how far back one observes, or
to how minute a size one reduces the physicist's nature, there is
always the "formless uncreated
before" that no human mind can comprehend. Noting this constraint, due
to
the nature of our humanity, we can reject the comments of
philosophers such as Dennett who observe: "The existence
of a universe obeying a set of laws as elegant as . . . the laws of our
own physics does not logically require an intelligent Lawgiver."
Based on humility, founded upon the logic and reason of our limits as
humans, it is a necessity that we believe in a Creator. Such a
belief is the highest intellectual challenge and in no way a "childish
vision . . . well on the road to extinction" (Dennett, 1995).
Nature, then, we study, estimate and define according to mechanical laws. We should understand nature on two kinds of principles - mechanical and teleological. When studying the holistic accord and unity of ecosystems, we need teleological laws.
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